-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 NEFARIOUSPLAN-CANONICAL-V1 {"body_md":"## The constructor runs before the cast\n\nThe vulnerable path is two methods long. In `SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.setValue`, the handler for the `exceptionName` element reads an attacker-controlled string from a SOAP `` child and hands it to `ClassUtils.forName`:\n\n```java\n} else if (\"exceptionName\".equals(hint)) {\n String faultClassName = (String) value;\n try {\n Class faultClass = ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName);\n builder.setFaultClass(faultClass);\n } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {\n // Just create an AxisFault, no custom exception\n }\n}\n```\n\n`ClassUtils.forName(name)` is the three-argument `Class.forName(name, true, loader)`, the `initialize=true` overload. Static initializers run on load. The comment says \"Just create an AxisFault\". The code performs no type check at all.\n\n`SOAPFaultBuilder.createFault` then takes that `faultClass` and invokes a constructor on it:\n\n```java\nConstructor con = faultClass.getConstructor(new Class[]{faultData.getClass()});\nObject o = con.newInstance(new Object[]{faultData});\nif (o instanceof AxisFault) {\n f = (AxisFault) o;\n}\n```\n\nThe constructor runs before the `instanceof` check. The whole block is inside `catch (Exception)`, so if `getConstructor` throws `NoSuchMethodException`, or `newInstance` throws anything at all including the gadget throwing on purpose, the server swallows it and continues. The reflected constructor's side effects persist. That is the primitive: unauthenticated `new AttackerNamedClass(attackerString)` for any public class on the server's classpath with a public `String` constructor.\n\nThe ordering rule is a state machine quirk. The `` SAX handler walks children in document order. A `` element before `` populates `faultData` as a `String` and the subsequent `exceptionName` overwrites `faultClass`. Reversed order, with `` first, triggers the string path for the `` handler and `faultClass` ends up as `java.lang.String`, which reduces the exploit to `new String(\"ATTACKER-REORDER-xxxx\")`. The dinosn lab `poc.py` runs both orders as probes 1 and 3 and confirms only the first produces a marker file.\n\n## Pre-auth because the envelope is parsed before the handler chain\n\nAxis's per-service security is a `` block in `server-config.wsdd`. The fixedbyreboot lab wires a `LabAuthHandler` onto a `SecureService` and the handler does `throw new AxisFault(\"Client.Unauthenticated\", ...)` on every invocation. The attacker's response is still `Client.Unauthenticated`. The marker file is still on disk.\n\nThe reason is in `AxisServer.invoke` around line 258:\n\n```java\n// This is a kludge. We should be able to get the message's SOAPEnvelope\n// without forcing a parse. But right now we need to.\nmsgContext.getRequestMessage().getSOAPEnvelope().getFirstBody();\n```\n\nThat call fires the full SAX parse. `BodyBuilder.onStartChild` constructs a `SOAPFaultBuilder` for any envelope-namespaced `` regardless of whether the message is a request or a response. The gadget runs inside the SAX callbacks, before `AxisServer.invoke` reaches `h.invoke(msgContext)` where handlers like `LabAuthHandler` would run. The comment calls it a kludge. It has been a kludge long enough for the kludge to acquire a CVE number.\n\nThe same code path handles dispatch when no service resolves: SAX parses the envelope so Axis can figure out where to route it. The dinosn lab confirms exploitation against `/axis/services/DoesNotExist`. The attack surface is any URL the servlet answers.\n\n## What you can construct with it\n\nReflection calls `getConstructor(String.class)` exactly. `ProcessBuilder(String...)` is a varargs signature and does not match. The constructor must be literally `X(String)` and the class must be public with a public `(Ljava/lang/String;)V`. The dinosn lab enumerated every such class on a stock Axis 1.4 + Tomcat 9 + JDK 8 classpath: 87 in `WEB-INF/lib`, 92 in Tomcat `lib/`, 862 in `rt.jar`. None of the thousand-plus are exec-capable. The closest stock primitives are `java.io.FileWriter(String)` for arbitrary file create and truncate, demonstrated in the lab; `java.io.File*Stream/Reader` for open-and-discard existence oracles; and `org.apache.log4j.helpers.SyslogWriter(String)` for a DNS lookup out-of-band oracle.\n\nRCE requires an application-supplied gadget. The one everyone reaches for is Spring's `ClassPathXmlApplicationContext(String)`, the same gadget as [CVE-2023-46604](https://nefariousplan.com/post/activemq-cve-2023-46604-trusted-the-xml-file-it-fetched) in ActiveMQ. The attacker hosts a Spring bean definition XML with a `ProcessBuilder` bean and `init-method=\"start\"`, passes the URL as the constructor argument, and the Spring context loader on the target fetches and parses it, which instantiates and starts the bean. The constructor argument is a URL. The content behind the URL is a command. The pattern has a name: content is command. CVE-2023-46604 was a nearly identical shape in a different product; the gadget still lands.\n\nConfluence Data Center ships Spring. Atlassian's advisory ([CONFSERVER-104610](https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2026-90436-remote-code-execution-in-confluence-data-center-1874560038.html)) lists 1.x through 9.x vulnerable when \"Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)\" is enabled, fixed in 9.2.28, removed entirely in 10.x. N-able N-central ships the same primitive through a different embedding, fixed in 2026.4 HF3. Rapid7 MDR reports in-the-wild exploitation starting around November 13 against both products.\n\n## The git log is the timeline\n\nThe vulnerable `setValue` method was committed by Tom Jordahl on October 1, 2002, in commit `a943148c2`, with the same four lines of unchecked `ClassUtils.forName` that `41f3b4e8` eventually patched. It shipped in Axis 1.0 and did not change through 1.4. Axis went end-of-life in 2006.\n\nThe fix commit is [`41f3b4e8`](https://github.com/apache/axis-axis1-java/commit/41f3b4e8d04e310ca81f86b92630ab2c11d608bd) on July 12, 2026. It changes two things. In `SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.setValue`, `ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName)` becomes `ClassUtils.forName(faultClassName, false, ...)` with a non-initializing load and an `AxisFault.class.isAssignableFrom(faultClass)` check that drops classes that are not `AxisFault` subtypes. In `SOAPFaultBuilder.createFault`, an `isAssignableFrom` gate precedes the reflective constructor branch. Both the initializing-load primitive and the arbitrary-constructor primitive close.\n\nThe commit message named the bug class. The CVE assignment came 117 days later: July 12 to November 6, with July 12 counted as day zero. The [oss-security post](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/06/12) is dated November 6. Rapid7 reports first in-the-wild exploitation on November 13. The patch was public on a git mirror for seventeen weeks before anyone had a CVE to search for. The pattern has a name: release lag disclosure.\n\nAxis 1.x is EOL. There will be no fixed release. The primitive has been on the wire of every Axis deployment since Axis 1.0 shipped. It took twenty-three years and seven months from Tom Jordahl's commit to Atlassian's advisory. It took four months from the public patch to the CVE.","closing_line":"The patch is four months older than the CVE. The primitive is twenty-three years older than the patch.","hook_md":"`SOAPFaultDetailsBuilder.setValue` runs `ClassUtils.forName` on an attacker-controlled string from the request body, then `SOAPFaultBuilder.createFault` reflectively invokes the resulting class's `String` constructor, and the surrounding `catch (Exception)` swallows the `ClassCastException` when the result turns out not to be an `AxisFault`. That is the whole vulnerability. The code has looked like this since October 1, 2002. The fix commit landed on July 12, 2026. The CVE caught up on November 6.","post_id":879,"slug":"axis-cve-2026-90436-fix-commit-older-than-the-cve","title":"CVE-2026-90436: Apache Axis Ran the Attacker's Constructor Before the Auth Handler. The Fix Commit Was 117 Days Older Than the CVE.","type":"initial","unreadable_sentence":"The fix commit landed on July 12 with a subject line that named the bug class. The CVE caught up on November 6. For 117 days the disclosure was the git log."} -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEARYIAB0WIQRf0htP5+SjynlxywneZjl4jgkQJgUCawHD0QAKCRDeZjl4jgkQ JmThAQDhmYru4rOcFHAd0c4hHBZC2qgwVW7MDzP/rGSTdkTTwwEA7/viJ6CxmzU1 AP0KpWa+GpgiugRCaSTbNHuGiVAKTQA= =4N+N -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----