-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 NEFARIOUSPLAN-CANONICAL-V1 {"body_md":"## The deck is the artifact\n\nThe first slide carries the panel label \"Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution\" and the line \"CVE-2025-24813.\" The authors credited on the same slide are Mohammed Krayem, Souhail Nmili, and Joao Paulo Mendes Gaspar. The eyebrow text reads \"SVEM project.\" Slide two's title is \"This RCE is not one bug. It is a configuration chain.\"\n\nSlide five shows a `web.xml` fragment with `readonly` set to `false`. Slide six shows a path-transform diagram: a request to `/uploads/anything/x.session`, sanitized into `.uploads.anything.x.session`, paired with a `JSESSIONID=.uploads.anything.x` cookie. Slide seven names the dependency: `commons-collections`. Slide eight is an interactive control. Four checkboxes labeled \"PUT enabled,\" \"Sessions on disk,\" \"Path equivalence reachable,\" and \"Vulnerable dependency\" each contribute a weight to an exploitability score that rises and falls as the audience toggles them.\n\nThe voice-recognition handler in `src/components/PateDeck.tsx` accepts `next slide`, `previous slide`, `prossimo`, `avanti`, `vai avanti`, `indietro`, `precedente`, and `vai indietro`. The Italian commands are not decoration. They are the audience the deck was built to address.\n\nThe chain itself is encoded in lines 56 through 85 of `PateDeck.tsx` as a four-step array:\n\n```ts\nconst chain = [\n { label: \"PUT upload\", title: \"DefaultServlet accepts writes\", detail: \"A misconfigured DefaultServlet uses readonly=false, so unauthenticated users can upload files.\" },\n { label: \"Path rewrite\", title: \"Path equivalence redirects the target\", detail: \"Tomcat sanitizes a crafted path so the uploaded file lands inside the session storage area.\" },\n { label: \"Session poison\", title: \"A forged JSESSIONID selects the file\", detail: \"The attacker names the payload so a matching cookie makes Tomcat load it as a session.\" },\n { label: \"Deserialize\", title: \"The gadget chain turns data into code\", detail: \"An outdated commons-collections dependency lets ysoserial generate a payload that runs commands.\" },\n];\n```\n\nThe four `detail` strings match the public description Apache published when CVE-2025-24813 was assigned in March 2025. The students did the reading.\n\n## The artifact does not contain the chain\n\nA recursive grep across the repository for `PUT`, `JSESSIONID`, `ysoserial`, and `commons-collections` returns six matches. Every match is a string literal inside a React component. The string `\"ysoserial\"` appears in the `detail` field of `chain[3]`. The string `\"JSESSIONID\"` appears in a `` element on the path-rewrite slide. The string `\"PUT\"` appears in a `label` field on the first chain node. The repository has no other use of any of the four words.\n\nThere is no HTTP client. There is no payload generator. There is no `requests.put` call, no `urllib`, no `fetch`, no `axios`. There is no `ysoserial.jar`, no Java source, no serialized object factory. There is no Tomcat installation the deck would run against, because the deck does not run against anything. It renders.\n\nThe dependencies in `package.json` are `next`, `react`, `react-dom`, `lucide-react`, and `tailwindcss`. The dependencies an exploit for CVE-2025-24813 would carry, at minimum, are an HTTP client and a Java payload generator. They are absent because the artifact is not an exploit. The artifact is a presentation, and the presentation framework's bones are the dependency list.\n\n## The package name remembers a different project\n\nThe package.json's `name` field is `pate-interactive-presentation`. The `public/pate-figures/` directory contains `noisy-thresholding-left.png` and `privacy-cost-right.png`. PATE is the Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles training scheme introduced by Papernot and collaborators for differentially-private machine learning. The two PNGs are figures from a PATE paper.\n\nThe component file is `PateDeck.tsx`. The exported React component is `PateDeck`. The component is about Apache Tomcat. The component name is residue from a previous assignment.\n\nThis is not deception. It is reuse. The students built a Next.js deck framework for a PATE presentation in a previous class block, retained the framework, replaced the slide contents, and renamed the GitHub repository. The artifacts in the directory tree are the seam that records the reuse. A reader who reads the repository name, the package name, the asset directory, and the slide content together sees three different topics and one piece of engineering.\n\nA scanner that indexes by repository name sees one signal: `CVE-2025-24813`.\n\n## The scanner cannot read the seam\n\nGitHub's search-by-keyword API surfaces this repository for the query `CVE-2025-24813`. Any aggregator that polls that API on a schedule and converts \"repository name contains CVE identifier\" into \"PoC available for CVE identifier\" registers this repository as a PoC. Our scanner did exactly that. The first-seen timestamp on the candidate row is 2026-05-19T15:21:11Z. The score is 6, decomposed as `gh-search+2, CVSS9.8+2, AV:N+1, PR:N+1`. The scoring rubric weighs the CVSS, the network reachability, the lack of authentication requirement, and the fact that the repository was returned by GitHub's keyword search against the CVE identifier. It does not weigh repository contents, because at indexing time the indexer has not opened them.\n\nThe signal the scanner emits to downstream consumers is \"PoC available for CVE-2025-24813.\" The signal a downstream consumer needs is \"an unauthenticated attacker has working code that delivers the partial PUT, the path-equivalent session-file write, and the deserialization gadget against a default Tomcat install.\" The first signal can be derived from the repository's name. The second signal would require reading the repository's contents. The two signals are different. The pipeline emits the first as if it were the second.\n\nFor CVE-2025-24813, a CVE on KEV since April 2025, the production reading of \"new PoC available\" is \"additional adversaries are now equipped.\" Incident response teams budget time accordingly. EDR detection rules get re-tuned. Patching deadlines move forward. The consumer acts on the second signal while the producer emitted the first.\n\n## Coursework PoC\n\nThis is a new pattern in the catalog. It is the sibling of [Placeholder PoC](/patterns/placeholder-poc), [Paywall PoC](/patterns/paywall-poc), and [Phantom Project Documentation](/patterns/phantom-project-documentation). All four share a shape: a GitHub repository whose name contains a CVE identifier and whose contents are not an exploit. The four patterns differ on what the author was trying to do.\n\nPlaceholder PoC: the author claims to ship an exploit and ships a CVE-shaped wrapper with the operational primitive marked as a parameter the user must adjust. The author lacks the primitive; the wrapper attaches their name to the CVE. The pattern is deception.\n\nPaywall PoC: the author monetizes the CVE-shaped repository name without delivering a primitive. The repository contents are sales copy and a link to a no-refunds crypto escrow. The pattern is fraud.\n\nPhantom Project Documentation: the author submitted disconnected prompts to a language model and shipped the outputs as a repository. Each artifact is internally consistent. The artifacts contradict each other when read together. The pattern is incoherent authorship.\n\nCoursework PoC: the author is doing assigned coursework. The CVE is the topic of the assignment. The repository contains the work product, a deck or a lab report or a writeup. The repository name carries the CVE identifier because the project's subject does. The students named their project after their topic. Their topic happens to be a CVE. The topic happens to share its naming convention with the scanner's index key.\n\nThe pattern is not deception, not fraud, not hallucination. The pattern is that a student's natural project-naming convention collides with the only signal the scanner reads.\n\n## What the exhibit contributes\n\nCVE-2025-24813 itself is fourteen months old, has been on KEV for more than a year, and has been analyzed by Apache, by NVD, by every commercial threat-intelligence vendor, by every red-team blog. The deck's reading of the chain matches the original disclosure. The students did the reading.\n\nThe repository contributes nothing to the public technical understanding of CVE-2025-24813. It contributes one instance of the pattern. The pattern matters because every educator who assigns a CVE walkthrough produces another one of these, and every scanner that reads repository names produces another false signal off the back of it. The two systems are not connected. They share a key.\n\nThe students named in the deck credits are not the threat. The threshold is.\n\nPoC: [suil12/CVE-2025-24813_presentation](https://github.com/suil12/CVE-2025-24813_presentation)","closing_line":"The deck describes the chain accurately. It does not contain it.","hook_md":"A GitHub repository named `CVE-2025-24813_presentation` was published on May 19, 2026. The repository contains a Next.js application. The application is a slide deck. The deck describes Apache Tomcat's partial-PUT-to-deserialization remote code execution chain across ten slides, with animated transitions, voice navigation in English and Italian, and an interactive widget that lets the audience toggle preconditions and watch an exploitability score recompute. The chain it describes is accurate. The repository contains zero lines of exploit code.\n\nThe package.json's `name` field is `pate-interactive-presentation`. The `public/pate-figures/` directory contains two PNG files from a Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles paper. The deck framework was built for a privacy-machine-learning topic and was reused for a Tomcat CVE topic.","post_id":362,"slug":"tomcat-cve-2025-24813-the-poc-is-a-slide-deck","title":"CVE-2025-24813: The PoC Is a Slide Deck","type":"initial","unreadable_sentence":"The repository name carries the CVE identifier because the project's subject does."} -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEARYIAB0WIQRf0htP5+SjynlxywneZjl4jgkQJgUCakV61QAKCRDeZjl4jgkQ JrXdAQCXBI/InLNHe9+XMRi67jhVW2chGlfQoDD95sDkwvcJiwD+Nmgg4sSASxT6 lScFYlj3ZUihvccokVVlvzADZ9abJAc= =KrvW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----